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This paper provides evidence on market surveillance from stock exchanges and securities 
commissions from 25 jurisdictions in North, Central and South America, Western and Eastern 
Europe, Africa and Asia.  Stock exchanges as SROs engage in a greater range of single-market 
surveillance of market manipulation than securities commissions, but the scope of cross-market 
surveillance activity is very similar among stock exchanges and securities commissions.  Cross-
market  surveillance  is  more  effective  with  information  sharing  arrangements,  and  securities 
commissions are more likely to engage in information sharing than stock exchanges.  The scope 
of cross-market surveillance is highly positively correlated with trading activity, unlike the scope 
of single-market surveillance.  The data also indicate that as at 2005, there is ample scope for 
jurisdictions to expand their cross-market surveillance and thereby stimulate investor confidence 
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  In  this  paper,  we  examine  the  market  surveillance  activities  from  exchanges  and 
securities commissions
1 from 25 jurisdictions in North, Central and South America, Western and 
Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia.  We study both single- and cross-market surveillance of market 
trading  to  detect  manipulative  practices  carried  out  by  market  participants,
2  and  relate 
surveillance  activities  to  trading  volume,  listings  and  market  capitalization  for  a  sample  of 
emerging  and  developed  stock  markets.  Exchanges  are  basically  commercial  entities  in  the 
business of providing a trading platform for securities and other market contracts. Surveillance 
departments within an exchange carry out its activities at a cost to an exchange organization, or 
rather,  surveillance  departments  are  “cost  centers”.  In  this  paper  we  attempt  to  explore  the 
relationship between surveillance activities and trading activity, deemed to be an exchange’s 
“profit  center”,  to  determine  the  effectiveness  of  surveillance.    Knowing  how  the  costs  of 
surveillance  facilitate  the  profits  of  trading  activity  and  the  like  is  therefore  a  fundamental 
question for market integrity and the operation of a stock exchange (Aitken and Siow, 2003).
3 
 
Market manipulation refers to a wide range of trading practices that distort prices and 
enable market manipulators to profit at the expense of other participants, creating information 
asymmetries.  Market surveillance is carried out by exchanges and securities commissions to 
detect such market manipulation by market participants. The manipulative practices are varied in 
nature,  although  there  are  more  “commonplace”  practices  that  are  easily  identifiable.  For 
example,  “insider  trading”,  the  trading  of  securities based  on information unavailable to the 
general public, is an example of a manipulative practice that is easily identifiable by the public. 
Other less well publicized manipulative practices include “spoofing” or “painting the tape” refers 
to a trader engaging in a series of transactions reported on a public display facility to give the 
impression of activity or price movement in a security (e.g. misleading trading, switches, giving 
up priority, layering bid/asks, fictitious orders for the case of spoofing, etc.).  “Pumping and 
dumping” or “ramping” refers to a trader buying at increasingly higher prices, whereby securities 
                                                 
     
1   For the purposes of this paper reference to exchanges include stock, bonds, commodities and derivatives 
markets. 
     
2  Unless otherwise indicated, “cross-market” refers to cross-product, cross-market (e.g., two exchanges in one 
jurisdiction) as well as cross-border (more than one jurisdiction). 
     
3  This view was shared by the heads of the market surveillance departments at a number of different securities 
commissions and stock exchanges around the world at the 2005 SMARTS Inc. Conference in Stockholm.  
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are sold in the market (often to retail customers) at the higher prices.  There are many other 
examples of manipulative behaviour including but not limited to “advancing the bid”, “front 
running”,  “churning”,  “capping/pegging”,  etc.,  each  defined  herein.    Ideally,  surveillance 
authorities have sophisticated mechanisms to detect such manipulative trading within their own 
market, as well as across markets, and jurisdictions. 
 
While  the  terms  insider  trading  and  market  manipulation  are  commonplace  in  the 
literature,  the  formal  discipline  in  which  these  concepts  take  centre  stage,  namely  market 
surveillance, has traditionally been shrouded in secrecy.  The oft cited reason for this opaqueness 
is to refrain from giving would be insider traders and/or market manipulators any idea that might 
allow them to avoid detection.  But arguably, in view of the intense competition for both new 
listings and trades, companies and investors should be in a position to compare and contrast the 
capabilities of different surveillance authorities as part of making a considered judgment about 
the risk/benefits of listing and investing in particular markets. Because manipulative activities are 
likely to have adverse consequences in terms of attracting new listings/investors to, and retaining 
existing listings/investors in, a marketplace, both exchanges and securities commissions have 
developed appropriate regulations and at the same time invested in security market surveillance 
activities to identify and prosecute such activity.  Prior research has analyzed the relationship 
between surveillance efforts and market integrity (Comerton-Forde and Rydge, 2006). This paper 
will extend this by looking at the relationship between market integrity and market efficiency. 
Understanding  the  effectiveness  of  security  market  surveillance  departments  should  help 
investors to gain confidence in a marketplace and therefore it seems sensible to compare and 
contrast such divisions.  This paper represents a first attempt to do so. 
   
  The specific issues addressed in our empirical analyses are as follows.  First, to what 
extent is single- and cross-market market surveillance carried out in different regions around the 
world?  Second, how effective is single- versus cross-market surveillance, and to what extent 
does single- and cross-market surveillance matter for facilitating an exchange’s trading volume 
and market capitalization?  The data examined, while somewhat limited in volume, provide a 
first-ever international comparison of single- and cross-market surveillance around the world.  
While  prior  theory  and  evidence  has  examined  various  aspects  of  market  manipulation  and  
 
5
surveillance of such manipulative practices,
4 no prior study has provided a direct international 
comparison of single and cross-market surveillance activities. 
 
The new surveillance data introduced in this paper indicate a number of new insights 
about sources of international difference in market integrity.  First, jurisdictions with exchanges 
which  are  self-regulatory  organizations  (“SROs”)
5  carry  out  more  intensive  single-market 
surveillance than securities commissions.  However, jurisdictions with exchanges as SROs do not 
play a greater role in cross-market surveillance than jurisdictions in which securities commissions 
play a significant role in market surveillance. 
 
Second, cross-market surveillance is much more effective when different jurisdictions 
have information sharing arrangements, and when such information sharing is broader in scope.  
Interestingly,  securities  commissions  are  more  likely  to  engage  in  information  sharing  than 
exchanges.  This is perhaps intuitive as securities commissions are less likely to view themselves 
as competitors among regulatory bodies than exchanges which are more commercial in nature.
6 
 
Note that there exists considerable debate about the effectiveness of SRO’s especially in 
light of exchanges demutualizing, moving from the not-for-profit model to for-profit model and 
the resulting conflicts of interest from markets competing with one another (DeMarzo, P. M. et al, 
2005; Carson, J, 2003; Fleckner, 2006; Karmel, R, 2000; O' Hara and Mendiola, 2003; Pritchard, 
2003; Romano, 2002; Reiffen and Robe, 2007).  Our findings contribute to this literature by 
indicating that exchanges continue to have a self-interested role in maintaining the integrity of 
their  own  market  in  order  to  attract  new  listings  and  increase  trading  activity.    However, 
exchanges  as  SROs  face  barriers  to  information  sharing  for  cross-market  surveillance  (as 
indicated under the second point immediately above) and hence there appears to be a pronounced 
role for securities commissions in facilitating cross-market surveillance.  While the central aim of 
our paper is not to address the debate about effectiveness of self-regulation in the literature, we 
hope our evidence inspires further work on topic.  Our central interest in this paper is in exploring 
issues to do with surveillance not previously considered in the literature. 
                                                 
     
4  This literature is briefly reviewed in section 2 of this paper. 
     
5   A self regulatory organization (SRO) is an exchange or regulator that has been given the responsibility and 
authority to regulate its members. 
     
6  For example, this view was shared by the surveillance authorities at NASD in conversations held in late May 




Third, there is scant evidence in the data herein that single-market surveillance is related 
to trading volume when the 25 jurisdictions are compared.  However, there is significant evidence 
that cross-market surveillance is highly positively correlated with trading activity.  In this paper 
we  provide  simultaneous  equation  analyses  that  control  for  the  endogeneity  of  surveillance 
activities vis-à-vis trading activity.  The data continue to show a strong positive relation between 
cross-market  surveillance  and  trading  activity  even  in  a  multivariate  context  with  numerous 
control variables and with specifications for endogeneity.  The evidence is consistent with the 
view that cross-market surveillance facilitates trading activity.  This finding holds when control 
variables are used for the sophistication of the market and the need for cross-market surveillance 
(such as the number of products, number of cross-listed securities, etc). 
 
Finally, as at 2005, the data indicate that most jurisdictions are focused on single-market 
surveillance,  and  have  insufficient  experience  and/or technology to properly carry out cross-
market  surveillance.    There  is  ample  scope  for  jurisdictions  to  expand  their  cross-market 
surveillance.  The data are consistent with the view that an increase in cross-market surveillance 
would stimulate investor confidence and trading activity.   
 
  This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the institutional details in regards 
to market surveillance and briefly surveys some related literature.  The data are introduced in 
section 3.  Multivariate tests are carried out in section 4.  Section 5 discusses extensions and 
future research in relation to the analyses carried out in this study.  The last section concludes.  
 
2. A Brief Review of Market Manipulation and Surveillance 
 
As with most trading platforms, surveillance systems within exchanges around the world 
are automated (Harris, 2002; Clayton et al., 2006).  Real time computer surveillance systems alert 
surveillance staff of unusual trading activity based on orders and executed trades.  Such alerts are 
not  usually  based  on  single  trades  but  are  generated  based  on  patterns  of  trading  to  detect 
potential manipulative practices.  Computer software providers, such as SMARTS Group, Inc.,
7 
customizes  its  system  to  manage  the  type  of  alerts  provided  to  surveillance  staff.  Such 
customization is necessary as each exchange or securities commissions around the world differ in 
                                                 
     
7  http://www.smartsgroup.com/  More generally, see Harris (2002).  
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scope and requirements for surveillance.  The set of alerts in conjunction with manipulative 
practices depicted in Table 1 is comprehensive for most surveillance systems however, and these 
alerts apply to both single-market manipulations as well as cross-market manipulations.  The 
central focus of the empirical analyses herein is first in documenting the extent to which scope of 
manipulations in Table 1 are suspected/detected, and second the scope of single- and cross-
market  surveillance  in  relation  to  trading  liquidity  and  other  measure  of  market  quality  in 
different exchanges around the world. 
 
[Table 1 About Here] 
 
Compared to cross-market surveillance systems, single- market surveillance systems can 
be directly implemented at comparatively low costs relative to the market capitalization of most 
any given exchange around the world.  Many smaller exchanges do not have the resources to 
effectively carry out single-market surveillance themselves (this involves appropriate technology 
as well as strong market knowledge, effective regulation, strong political will, etc.)  External 
surveillance providers offer outsourcing (even in a different country relative to the country in 
which the exchange is based) of full service standard single-market surveillance for a minimal 
cost.    For  example,  SMARTS  Group  (www.smartsgroup.com)  has  installed  security  market 
surveillance systems at the Saudi Arabian Stock Exchange, the Abu Dhabi Securities Market, the 
Dubai  Financial  Markets  and  the  Securities  and  Commodities  Commission  of  the  UAE  and 
provides  a  staff  member  and  full  service  single-market  surveillance  off-site  from  Sydney 
Australia.  SMARTS Group can be contacted directly for their pricing schedules; at the time of 
writing, the annual cost was easily affordable by even the smallest exchanges.  The SMARTS 
Group  also  provides  on-site  surveillance  for  the  London  Stock  Exchange  and  many  other 
exchanges around the world.   
 
Cross-market surveillance (including cross-product, cross-market within a country and 
cross-border), involves much greater technical sophistication that is not easily replicated by an 
exchange for the following reasons.  The level of sophistication of financial trading patterns 
across different products (such as derivatives and securities) is much more complicated (and our 
data below suggest many surveillance authorities in different countries do not appear to be aware 
of the ways in which traders can carry out manipulative cross-market trades).  Computer software 
to  detect  cross-market  manipulations  to  pick  up  patterns  of  trading  across  markets  needs 
significantly  greater  sophistication  than  the  simple  single-market  trading  alerts.    External  
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surveillance providers such as SMARTS Group do provide cross-market surveillance, but such 
productized or customized solutions come at a substantially higher cost both for the development 
of  the  technology  and  the  on-going  surveillance  effort.    Surveillance  staff  members  need  to 
coordinate surveillance across different markets monitored, which requires proper organizational 
alignment.  As well, for cross-market and cross-border surveillance there needs to be information 
sharing  arrangements  and  coordination  of  surveillance  for  cross-market  and  cross-border 
surveillance to be effective. Such coordination is further complicated by the protectionist policies 
arising  from  the  commercial  self  interest  of  the  respective  markets  and  the  related  cross 
jurisdictional  legality  issues.    In  short,  cross-market  surveillance  is  much  more  costly  and 
complicated than single-market surveillance 
 
It is important to note that the different types of market manipulation identified in Table 1 
can be the subject of both single- and cross-market surveillance.  Any type of single-market 
manipulation can also be a cross-market manipulation (e.g., for a security that is listed on more 
than 1 exchange.)  For example, wash trades may take place across markets (in fact, multiple 
transactions across markets could be used as a way to disguise wash trades).  Front-running may 
also take place across markets where brokers place orders ahead of client orders for the same 
security traded on a different exchange.  It is also important to note that short sales and trade 
throughs may not be considered manipulative behavior per se, as indicated in Table 1, but were 
considered  important  enough  by  various  surveillance  authorities  that  vetted  our  list  of 
manipulations (these items can be manipulative in conjunction with other activities).  Regardless, 
we considered the empirics and regressions with and without short sales and trade throughs as 
manipulative and did not find any material differences in our results.   
 
  In addition to examining the scope of single- and cross-market surveillance, we also 
assess in this paper the effectiveness of the surveillance systems in different jurisdictions around 
the world.  Effectiveness depends on a number of factors.  First, alerts should minimize false 
positive  and  maximize  true  positive  manipulative  practices.    To  be  able  to  do  this,  the 
surveillance  system  needs  to  ascertain  normal  trading  activity  to  set  alert  parameters.    For 
example,  normal  price  and  volume  measures need  to  be  set  for  typical  trading ranges for a 
particular product traded on the exchange.  Second, a surveillance department should be able the 
reconstruct all trading activity to replay the full order/quote schedule.  It is also important for 
market surveillance to identify the activity of each market participant.  Third, the surveillance 
staff needs to be versed on the issues that need to be investigated.  The quality of a surveillance  
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system depends on the quality of the software used and the degree to which the surveillance staff 
are educated and trained with regard to using the information provided in the alerts.  Fourth, the 
effectiveness of a surveillance system also depends on the degree to which market participants are 
informed  about  the  surveillance  activities.    Fifth,  for  cross-market  surveillance,  surveillance 
effectiveness depends to a significant degree on the extent to which information is shared across 
jurisdictions.    Sixth,  the  efficiency  of  the  surveillance  system  depends  on  the  regulatory 
framework.    In  many  jurisdictions  around  the  world,  the  exchanges  themselves  are  SROs 
whereby they establish their own listing standards, monitor and discipline market participants for 
violation of their rules of operation.  In other jurisdictions, the securities commission has a greater 
role in setting listing standards and trading rules.  Recent empirical evidence is consistent with the 
view that private enforcement benefits markets while public enforcement does little to benefit 
markets (La Porta et al., 2006) and more specifically, recent theory finds that SROs that are for-
profit  organizations  have  greater  incentives  to  enforce  rules  than  not-for-profit  SROs  and 
misreporting by reportees is more likely when an SRO is not-for profit (Reiffen and Robe, 2007).  
 
The  central  conjecture  that  is  tested  in  this  paper  is  that the  scope of single-market 
surveillance  is  unrelated  to  trading  volume,  while  the  scope  of  cross-market  surveillance  is 
significantly positively correlated with trading volume.  Because single-market surveillance can 
be easily replicated on any exchange and at comparatively low cost, single-market surveillance 
does  not  distinguish  an  exchange  and  inspire  confidence  among  traders  relative  to  that  of 
competitor exchanges.  By contrast, cross-market surveillance is sufficiently complex and costly 
that it cannot be replicated by lower quality exchanges.  Cross-market surveillance will be carried 
out  in  higher  quality  exchanges  and  inspire  confidence  among  traders  and  facilitate  trading 
volume.  We expect a bi-directional causality between the scope of cross-market surveillance and 
trading volume, as larger exchanges will have larger budgets for surveillance, and surveillance 
inspires market confidence and thereby attracts traders and facilitates trading. 
 
Our central hypotheses are related to a number of papers on the law and economics of 
securities  regulation,  market  surveillance,  market  efficiency  and  market  integrity.    There  is 
evidence  from  a  few  country-  and  market-specific  studies  that manipulative trading impedes 
market integrity, as well as theoretical work on topic.  For instance, Hillion and Suominen (2004) 
study  manipulation  around  closing  times.    Merrick  et  al.  (2005)  study  the  effect  of  trading 
activities  in  one  market  in  relation  to  price  changes  in  another  market,  thereby  enabling 
manipulators to profit from what is known as a “squeeze”.  Pirrong (1993, 1995, 1999, 2004)  
 
10
studies  the  relationship  between  commodity  and  financial  markets  and  the  ability  of  market 
manipulators  to  profit from  cross-market  manipulation.    Easterbrook  (1986)  and Kumar  and 
Seppi (1992) provide similar analyses of manipulation of futures markets.  As well, Ni et al. 
(2005) provide evidence of manipulative trading as between stock prices and derivative prices in 
that stock prices tend to converge on the strike price of the associated derivative at the time of 
expiration  of  the  derivative  (see  also  Jarrow,  1992,  1994,  for  evidence  of  manipulation  of 
derivatives markets).  Aggarwal and Wu (2003) provide evidence from the United States (“US’) 
that market manipulation impedes market efficiency (see also Allen and Gale, 1992, and Allen 
and  Gorton,  1992,  for  related  theoretical  work).    Comerton-Forde  and  Rydge    (2006)  show 
surveillance  efforts  improve  market  integrity  in  Australia.    Aitken  and  Siow  (2003)  provide 
international evidence of market efficiency in terms of transaction costs and market integrity 
based on the likelihood of a security being subject to ramping in the last 15 minutes of trading; 
they find a strong positive correspondence between efficiency and integrity.
8  La Porta et al. 
(2006) and Daouk et al. (2005) provide evidence that market integrity around the world depends 
critically on securities regulation.
9  Overall, therefore, we may infer that market integrity depends 
not only on market regulation but also on the quality of market surveillance that limits the extent 
of market manipulation.  Prior work, however, has not directly examined the role of single- and 
cross-market surveillance in facilitating market integrity in an international setting.  Our paper 
fills this gap in the literature. 
 
Our empirical analyses in the next sections are based on a new dataset which measures 
the  scope  of  single-and  cross-market  surveillance.    The  data  match  a  number  of  exchange 
characteristics and outcomes with the scope of surveillance activities, among other things.  The 
data are introduced in the next section. 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
  The data in this paper are derived from questionnaires sent to 75 jurisdictions 
around the world.
10  One limitation to obtaining data through a survey is the possibility of 
sample selection and response bias. While we acknowledge that this is a possibility, we believe 
                                                 
     
8  See also Gerard and Nanda (1992), Felixson and Pelli (1999), Mahoney (1999) and Vitale (2000). 
     
9  For related work, see La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999a,b, 2002), Romano (1993, 2002), Berkowitz et al. 
(2003), Pistor et al. (2003) and Pistor and Xu (2003). 
     
10  A copy of the survey is available upon request from the authors.  
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from a detailed analysis of the responses received and the data obtained from the responses that 
this concern does not arise in this exercise.  First, the jurisdictions were identified from various 
sources including the membership of The World Federation of Exchanges, the trade association 
of the exchange industry, which comprises 54 exchanges that account for over 97% of global 
stock market capitalization, and the affiliate and correspondent organizations of the federation 
(another 55 organizations).
11 Potential respondents were also identified from the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) membership which comprises 110 securities 
commissions.
12 Of the potential respondents however, 35 transitional or frontier markets with 
more negligible market capitalization have been excluded because we believe that the possibility 
of  sample  selection  bias  is  mitigated  by  extent  of  total  global  market  capitalization  of  the 
exchanges/jurisdictions that were sent survey questionnaires. Second, survey data were gathered 
for a final sample of 25 jurisdictions which we believe to be an extremely good response rate in 
view of the very detailed confidential information required of the respondents.  The jurisdictions 
participating  in  the  study  comprise  16  exchanges  and  9  securities  commissions  from North, 
Central  and  South  America,  Western and Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia.  There were no 
overlaps of exchanges and securities commissions. For reasons of confidentiality, we do not 
identify any particular jurisdiction due to the sensitive nature of some of the data collected and 
the potential for readers to identify specific organizations based on location. The geographic 
distribution  of  the  exchanges  is  however  represented  in  Figure  1.  Finally,  the  survey 
questionnaires we designed were also vetted by Regulation Services, Inc. (Canada), SMARTS, 
Inc. (Australia), the Singapore Stock Exchange and the Australian Stock Exchange to ensure that 
the  possibility  of  sample  selection  bias  is  further  mitigated  by  the  breadth  of  information 
obtained.  The questionnaires were directed towards the Head of the Surveillance Departments in 
the exchange and/or securities regulators in the jurisdiction.  We realise that we cannot absolutely 
rule out the possibility of a sample selection and response bias due to the unique nature of the 
data collection and the rather limited number of jurisdictions that have a significant enough 
market  activity.  Limitations  in  our  sample  size,  as  well  as  the  limited  information  about 
comparable academic work on single-market versus cross market surveillance, however, makes 
reliable statistical comparisons of our sample nearly impossible.  
 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
                                                 
     
11   See e.g., http://www.world-exchanges.org the official web site of The World Federation of Exchanges. 
     





Summary  statistics  by  region  are  provided  in  Table  2.    Table  2  indicates  the 
characteristics of the survey respondents versus non-respondents.  Table 2 indicates that the mean 
market capitalization for the exchanges in the Americas in our sample is 0.26 the size of the mean 
for the non-included exchanges, but the median is 4.98 times larger for the exchanges in our 
sample.  Similarly, the mean value of the market capitalization of the exchanges in Asia is 0.83 of 
the mean value of the exchanges in Asia not included in our sample, while the median market 
capitalization  is  4.06  times  larger  than  the  median  market  capitalization  of  exchanges  not 
included in the data.  Finally, in Europe/Africa the mean value of the market capitalization is 1.75 
times the mean value of the exchanges in Asia not included in our sample, while the median 
market capitalization is 0.56 of the value of the median market capitalization of exchanges not 
included in the data.  These differences between means and medians for the exchanges included 
versus  excluded  from  our  sample  are  attributable  to  the  non-normal  distribution  of  market 
capitalization of exchanges.  For instance, in North, Central and South America there are a few 
very large exchanges and many small exchanges.  The same applies to the other regions around 
the world. 
 
[Table 2 About Here] 
 
While the small samples do not enable very statistically accurate comparison of mean and 
median tests in Table 2, we nevertheless provide these tests (of course, the most appropriate test 
is for the full sample where there are 25 observations in the group of included jurisdictions).  In 
the  regression  analyses  below,  we  control  for  proxies  for  exchange  size  and  consider  the 
robustness of the results to outliers.  We recognize potential limitations with the data and have 
presented as much information as possible, subject to not violating confidentiality to obtain the 
data.  But as this is the first time this type of study has been carried out, we also recognize that the 
data are exploratory in nature and hope there will be further studies on topic, as we discuss in 
section 5 below. 
 
Figure 2 presents the scope of single- and cross-market surveillance analyzed by the 
exchanges.    In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  potential  respondents  are  from  both  developed  and 
emerging markets around the world, a definition of each manipulative practice was provided in 
the survey to ensure uniformity in identifying the “standard” manipulative practices which may 
not  necessarily  be  the  same  across  markets.  Note  also  that  while  there  may  be  other  more  
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contemporary or enlightened ways to manipulate markets we limited our analysis to the 22 we 
have  listed  as  they  are  deemed  to  be  more  recognizable  and  the  more  universal  forms  of 
manipulation (as vetted by the abovementioned organizations) . We then asked the respondents to 
indicate whether for each type of manipulative practice surveillance is carried out on a single-
market or cross-market level. The scope of single-market surveillance is indicated as a percentage 
of  all  25  exchanges.    The  most  common  types  of  manipulation  subject  to  single-market 
surveillance  includes  wash  trades,  matched  orders,  spoofing/painting  the  tape,  pumping  and 
dumping and marking the close for exchanges (all defined in Table 1).  Cross-market surveillance 
is more intensive for capping/pegging, insider trading and dissemination of false and misleading 
information. 
 
[Figure 2 About Here] 
 
The scope of cross-market surveillance in Figure 2 is indicated as a percentage of the 
jurisdictions with foreign companies listed on the local exchange (13 jurisdictions in total), and 
not as a percentage of the total number of jurisdictions (25).  Note that all jurisdictions in the 
sample  comprised  exchanges  that  traded  a  multitude  of  products,  and  hence  cross-market 
surveillance is relevant for all exchanges.  However, cross-border surveillance is less applicable 
to some of the exchanges.  Hence, Figure 2 presents the extent of cross-market surveillance in a 
way that provides a favorable view (that is, favorable to the surveillance authorities) as to the 
degree of importance of the issue of cross-market surveillance in relation to what is actually 
monitored, in comparison to the extent of single-market surveillance.  The data clearly indicate 
that there is a dearth of cross-market surveillance relative to the need for such cross-market 
surveillance, even when the scope of cross-market surveillance is perhaps overstated relative to 
its need as in Figure 2. 
 
Table  3  provides  definitions  of  the  different  variables  considered,  categorized  by 
surveillance, exchange and jurisdiction variables.  The scope of single-market surveillance is the 
sum of dummy variables equal to 1 where surveillance in the jurisdiction involves considering the 
market matters in Table 1.  This means for each type of manipulation a dummy variable of 0 or 1 
is  assigned  depending  on  whether  this  issue  is  investigated  by  the  regulator  and  that  these 
variables  are  then  summed  across  the  market.    Similarly,  for  the  scope  of  cross-market 
surveillance it  is the sum of dummy variables equal to 1 where surveillance in the jurisdiction 
involves considering the market matters in Table 1 either on a cross-product, cross-exchange or  
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cross-jurisdiction basis.  As explained in the text accompanying Table 1 in section 2 above, the 
different types of manipulation can be carried out on a single- or cross-market basis. 
 
[Table 3 About Here] 
 
Figure 3 presents a graphical analysis of trading activity in relation to the scope of market 
surveillance.  The data indicate that the scope of single-market manipulations suspected/detected 
is uncorrelated with trading activity (the correlation is 0.13; see Table 4 below).
13  However, the 
data quite clearly depict a positive relation between the scope of cross-market surveillance and 
trading activity (the correlation is 0.77; see Table 5 below).  One interpretation of the data is that 
larger jurisdictions with richer countries are more inclined to invest in cross-market surveillance, 
and  also  have  more  intensive  trading  activity.    A  second  interpretation  is  that  cross-market 
surveillance facilitates increased confidence in the market and thereby enhances trading activity.  
This  dual  causality  hypothesis  is  considered  in  the  multivariate  empirical  analyses  provided 
below in the next section. 
 
[Figure 3 About Here] 
 
Table 4 Panel A indicates the average exchange in the data carries out surveillance on 14-
15  different  types  of  manipulation  on  a  single-market  basis,  but  only  2-3  different  types  of 
manipulations on a cross-market basis. As indicated above and in Table 3, these numbers are 
derived  by  adding  up  the  dummy  variables  equal  to  1  where  surveillance  for  each  type  of 
manipulation is carried out on a single-market or cross-market basis. 
 
[Table 4 About Here] 
 
Table 4 Panel B provides data on the extent to which exchanges versus commissions are 
involved in surveillance.  The data are provided on a ranking scale from 1-5, where 1 indicates 
the  securities commission is  primarily responsible  and 5 indicates the exchange is primarily 
responsible.  For the average jurisdiction, the responsibility is shared in terms of establishing 
                                                 
     
13  Note, however, that this does not refer to the quality of single-market surveillance.  We may expect that 
exchanges with higher quality surveillance (in terms of technology and people, for example) are better able to facilitate 
market confidence and thereby enhance trading activity, etc.  See, e.g., Aitken and Siow (2003).  Below, in this paper 
we also provide some evidence about the quality of surveillance.   
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rules, monitoring and enforcement.  In most jurisdictions the exchange has the primary role for 
real time surveillance as well as post trade surveillance.  The typical exchange shares information 
on 4 of 9 dimensions (these 9 dimensions are defined in Table 2), has 1 surveillance department, 
and provides a self ranking of 2.15 out of 5 for effectiveness on the different dimensions of 
surveillance (the effectiveness dimensions are also defined in Table 3). 
 
The data were provided on a completely confidential basis and as such, median minimum 
and maximum values are not indicated in Table 4 for market variables in order to maintain 
confidentiality.  We are nevertheless able to indicate averages, medians and standard deviations.  
Table 4 Panel A indicates that the average exchange in the data is small relative to the trading 
activity on the US exchanges, as expected since the data are from a broad array of exchanges 
from emerging and developed markets from around the world.  The average exchange in the data 
has 567 listed companies, of which 5% are foreign and 2% are cross listed on the US exchanges.  
As well, the average [median] number of products traded is 7.36 [8], thereby giving rise to a 
significant need for cross-product surveillance (e.g., as between derivatives and stocks, etc.).  
 
Table  4  Panel  B  provides  evidence  about  the  scope  of  single-and  cross-market 
surveillance as it differs between exchanges and securities commissions.  Exchanges as SROs 
engage  in  a  greater  range  of  different  types  of  single-market  surveillance  than  securities 
commissions, but the scope of cross-market surveillance activity is very similar among exchanges 
and securities commissions.  Table 4 Panel B also presents evidence in which the surveillance 
authorities were asked to provide a self-evaluation in respect of their effectiveness in regard to 
various aspects of their surveillance.  On average, exchanges are more confident than securities 
commissions  in  respect  of  their  effectiveness.    Figure  4  presents  similar  evidence  of  actual 
manipulations  detected  (excluding  false  positives)  in  relation  to the number of trades in the 
jurisdiction.    The  data  in  Figure  4  is  presented  for  a  limited  sample  of  5  exchanges  and  6 
securities  commissions  (these  extremely  detailed  data  could  not  be  obtained  from  the  other 
jurisdictions).  Consistent with Table 4 Panel B, the data in Figure 4 indicate exchanges typically 
have  more  success  in  detecting  manipulations  than  securities  commissions,  although  this 
difference has been narrowing over the period 2002-2005.
14 
                                                 
     
14  While the use of subjective assessments is not ideal, the use of a 5-point scale is widely regarded as the most 
appropriate (see, e.g., Kidd, 1975).  As well, note that the information in Figure 4 is very consistent with the rankings 
regarding  the  effectiveness  of  surveillance  across  securities  commissions  versus  exchanges  in  Table  4  Panel  B  (a 




 [Figure 4 About Here] 
 
Table 4 Panel B also presents data in regards to information sharing arrangements across 
jurisdictions, and differences as between exchanges and securities commissions.  The data clearly 
indicate securities commissions are much more likely to have information sharing arrangements 
than exchanges, and share a greater amount of information.  The types of information shared are 
graphically illustrated in Figure 5, and there are clear pronounced differences in the willingness 
of exchanges to coordinate information sharing relative to securities commissions. 
 
[Figure 5 About Here] 
 
Table 5 provides correlations across a number of the surveillance and market variables in 
the data.  The correlations indicate that jurisdictions with exchanges responsible for surveillance 
are  typically  engaged  in  a  greater  scope  of  single-market  surveillance,  but  not  cross-market 
surveillance.    Jurisdictions  whereby  there  are  a  greater  number  of  departments  involved  in 
surveillance are more likely to be engaged in cross-market surveillance.  Exchanges that are more 
directly  involved  than  securities  commissions  in  establishing  trading  rules,  monitoring  and 
enforcing rules are more likely to provide a self-evaluation of greater effectiveness in terms of 
quality of surveillance.  This evidence is consistent with the somewhat related research on new 
listings and the ineffectiveness of public enforcement of securities regulation around the world 
(La Porta et al., 2006).   
 
[Table 5 About Here] 
 
In  terms  of  the  relations  between  surveillance  variables  and  market  variables,  the 
correlations in Table 5 indicate jurisdictions that engage in a greater scope of single-market 
surveillance  are  more  likely  to  have  a  greater  number  of  trades,  but  not  in  a  statistically 
significant  way  (the  correlation  is  0.13).    Nevertheless,  consistent  with  Figure  2,  there  is  a 
statistically significant correlation of 0.77 between the scope of cross-market surveillance and the 
number of trades in a jurisdiction.  The scope of cross-market surveillance is also positively and 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Panel B), which suggests the rankings are consistent with practice in the jurisdictions.  We tried to overcome the use 
of  subjective  assessments  by  comparing  the  responses  of  securities  commissions  versus  exchanges  in  the  same 
jurisdiction to see if the responses were consistent, but were unable to obtain such data.    
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significantly correlated with the total value of trades (correlation equal to 0.62), the number of 
listed companies (0.51), market capitalization (0.58), the proportion of companies cross-listed in 
the US (0.42) and the number of products traded on the exchange (0.40).   
 
In  addition  to  providing  suggestive  relations  between  variables  of  interest,  the 
correlations in Table 4 provide guidance as to potential problems for multicollinearity in the 
multivariate  analyses  in  the  next  section  below.    Further  to  the  correlation  evidence,  the 
multivariate analyses below sort out issues of causality between surveillance activity and trading, 
among other things. 
 
4. Multivariate Analyses 
 
Our  multivariate  analyses  are  separated  into  two  parts.    The  first  part,  reported  in 
subsection 4.1, considers the scope of surveillance activity.  Thereafter subsection 4.2 considers 
the effectiveness of such market surveillance. 
 
4.1. The Scope of Market Surveillance 
 
  Section 3 presented graphs and univariate correlations indicating a relationship between 
cross-market  surveillance  and  trading  activity,  along  with  other  variables  in  the  data.    The 
correlation evidence is suggestive, but does not get at the question of whether surveillance is 
caused by, and/or causes, trading activity.  That is, an increase in surveillance should enhance 
market  confidence  and  market  participation  thereby  enhancing  trading  activity.    Similarly, 
markets with greater trading activity have greater revenues from which to invest in surveillance. 
 
In order to address this issue of simultaneous causality between surveillance and trading, 
we  employ  three-stage  least  squares  methods  whereby  trading  and  single-  and  cross-market 
surveillance are simultaneously explained.  We control for proxies for exchange size and consider 
the robustness of the results to outliers in order to make sure the specifications do not pick up a 
spurious relation between cross-market surveillance and trading due to the sophistication of the 
market (due to the number of products and cross listed securities, for example).  As fully as 
possible, we control for market characteristics to observe the importance of surveillance over and 
above  the  market  characteristics.    We focus  our  discussion  on  Model  (1)  in  Table  6  which 




     (1)   Scope  of  Single-market  Surveillance  =  f  (the  degree  to  which  the  exchange 
versus  the  securities  commission  is  involved  in  post  trade  surveillance,  the 
number of trades) 
 
     (2)   Scope of Cross-market Surveillance = f (the degree to which the exchange versus 
the securities commission is involved in post trade surveillance, the extent of 
information sharing in neighbour jurisdictions, the number of trades, the number 
of products traded, the proportion of US cross-listings) 
 
     (3)   Number of Trades = f (the scope of single-market surveillance, the scope of 
cross-market surveillance, civil law dummy variable, GDP per capita,  and the 
proportion of US cross listings) 
 
In  this  system  of  three  equations,  the  scope  of  single-market  surveillance,  cross-market 
surveillance and the number of trades are considered endogenous variables.  The other variables 
are considered exogenous.  We also use as an instrument the number of departments involved in 
surveillance in order to ensure the system of equations is identified in Model (3), as discussed 
further below.  Below, we briefly explain the rationale underlying this specification.  Note as well 
that  other  specifications  were  considered  and  are  quite  robust  to  alternative  specifications 
(available upon request). 
 
  The  degree  to  which  the  exchange  versus  the  securities  commission  is  involved  in 
surveillance is likely to have a significant influence on the scope of surveillance in equations (1) 
and (2) for two possible alternative reasons.  On one hand, the exchange has a self-interested 
financial role in providing the highest integrity market to enhance trading activity and revenues, 
suggesting there should be a positive relation between the role of the exchange and surveillance.  
On the other hand, public enforcement may be associated with greater surveillance insofar as 
public regulators have more severe enforcement powers, and can secure more information from 
market participants through legal proceedings, etc.
15 
                                                 
     
15  These  competing  hypotheses  are  the  central  focus  in  La  Porta  et  al.  (2006)  in  the  context  of  securities 
regulation and initial public offerings around the world, and are summarized more completely therein.  La Porta et al. 
find evidence in support of the view that private enforcement benefits markets, but not public enforcement, which is 




  The extent to which trading activity takes place in a market is likely a predictor of both 
single- and cross-market surveillance.  Jurisdictions with more intensive trading have greater 
revenues and therefore greater financial ability to put in place more sophisticated technology and 
better trained staff to be engaged in surveillance.  While there are other proxies that are highly 
correlated with trading volume, such as GDP per capita, market capitalization, etc., we do not 
simultaneously include these control variables in order to avoid collinearity problems. 
 
  In equation (2) for cross-market surveillance we also include a variable for the extent of 
information sharing across jurisdictions.  To a certain degree this variable will be exogenous in 
that information sharing is due to the neighbouring jurisdiction’s predisposition to engage in 
information sharing.  Information sharing, however, is endogenous to cross-border surveillance 
insofar as only jurisdictions with cross-border listed securities will have a more direct incentive to 
share information.  The specification reported below does not control for this endogeneity issue 
for three reasons.  First, our definition of ‘cross-market’ concerns anything from cross-product to 
cross-border trading, and not just cross-border activities.  Second, even where exchanges do not 
have cross-border listed securities, traders may nevertheless engage in trades across jurisdictions, 
and this renders all exchanges subject to facing a need to share information regardless of the 
extent of cross-listed and/or foreign securities.  Third, even when we did consider instruments to 
control for potential endogeneity of information sharing vis-à-vis cross-market surveillance (such 
as location variables), the results did not vary in a statistically significant way; therefore, we 
report the results without the instruments for this variable. 
 
There is arguably less of a concern with regard to the endogeneity of the variables for the 
number of products and the proportion of US cross-listed securities in equation (2).  Introducing a 
new product gives rise to (causes) more surveillance, and not vice versa.  Cross listing in the US 
is the decision of the listed company, not the exchange. As such, we treat these explanatory 
variables as exogenous in the system.   
 
  The dependent variable in equation (3) is the number of trades.  The right-hand-side 
variables include controls for civil versus common law and GDP per capita, which is consistent 
with La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2006).  Equation (3) also controls for the proportion of US 
cross-listings, which is considered to be exogenous as in equation (2).  Both the single- and cross-




  Table 6 presents three alternative Models.  Model (1) uses trading activity.  Models (2) 
and (3) in Table 6 are very similar, with the exception that Model (2) uses the number of listed 
companies instead of the number of trades and Model (3) uses market capitalization instead of the 
number of listed companies.  These variables are positively correlated with one another, and as 
such they are not considered in the same model.  The objective in Models (2) and (3) is similar to 
Model (1): to control for the endogeneity of surveillance vis-à-vis market integrity and exchange 
performance.  Two versions of Model (3) are presented (Models 3a and 3b) in order to show 
robustness to identification with statistically significant coefficients. 
 
[Table 6 About Here] 
 
   The evidence in Table 6 indicates a strong positive association between the role of an 
exchange in post-trade surveillance and the scope of single-market surveillance.  The economic 
significance  is  such  that  a  20%  increase  in  the  role  of  the  exchange  versus  the  securities 
commission (an increase in the ranking by 1 point out of 5) is associated with surveillance of 3 
additional types of single-market manipulations, and this effect is significant at the 1% level of 
significance.  Trading activity, however, is statistically unrelated to single-market surveillance in 
Table 6, consistent with the graphical depiction of the data in Figure 3. 
 
  While  trading  activity  and  single-market  surveillance  are  statistically  uncorrelated, 
trading activity is strongly positively associated with the scope of cross-market surveillance in a 
statistically significant way in Table 6.  An increase in trading activity by 100 million trades is 
associated with an increase in the scope of surveillance by 4 types of cross-market surveillance, 
and this effect is significant at the 1% level.  The scope of cross-market surveillance is also 
affected by the extra of US cross-listings: a 2% increase in US cross-listings is associated with a 
greater scope in cross-market surveillance by 1 type of market manipulation (and this effect is 
likewise significant at the 1% level). 
 
  Model (1) in Table 6 further indicates trading activity is enhanced by the extent of cross-
market  surveillance  (although  not  single-market  surveillance).    An  increase  in  the  scope  of 
surveillance by 1 extra type of manipulation is associated with 25 million extra trades per year.  
The economic significance of this effect is quite large, and as such, we considered the role of 
influential observations and outliers in driving this result.  Cook’s distances and leverage plots  
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consistently pointed to one influential observation, and this observation is graphically apparent in 
Figure 3: the observation from the exchange with the greatest number of trades.  We re-ran the 
regressions  in  Table  6  without  that  one  influential  observation  and  found  the  economic 
significance reduced by approximately half (and the effect remained statistically significant at the 
1%  level);  in  particular,  an  increase  the  scope  of  cross-market  surveillance  by  1  type  of 
manipulation is associated with 10 million extra trades per year. 
 
As a further alternative specification (not explicitly reported but available upon request), 
we used a variable for the number of trades per listed company, and the effect continued to 
remain significant at the 1% level.  The economic significance was such that an increase in scope 
of cross-market surveillance facilitates an extra 9,800 trades per listed company in equation (3).  
Conversely, in equation (2) the effect of the number of trades per listed company on the scope of 
cross-market surveillance remained significant at the 1% level, whereby an extra 100,000 trades 
per company is associated with an extra 8 types of cross-market manipulations investigated. 
 
Other variables in Model (1) equation (3) explaining trading activity are less significant 
than and/or not as robust as the cross-market surveillance variable.  For instance, despite the 
strong correlation of 0.31 between GDP per capita and the number of trades in Table 5 (which is 
significant at the 10% level of significance), the multivariate evidence in Table 6 does not support 
a significant relation between GDP per capita and the number of trades in Model 1.  Table 6 also 
indicates exchanges with a greater proportion of US cross-listings have fewer trades.  We note, 
however, that that effect is not robust and is highly influenced by the inclusion/exclusion of the 
other variables.  However, when we exclude the variable for the proportion of the US cross-
listings in Model (1) for equation (3), the other variables are not affected in any statistically 
significant way. 
 
  In  sum,  Model  (1)  in  Table  6  indicates  a  strong  relation  between  cross-market 
surveillance and trading activity, and this relation is stronger and more robust than any other 
variable considered.  As the statistical relation between cross-market surveillance and trading 
activity is central new finding in this paper, it is worth stressing the nature of this relation that is 
apparent in the data.  The data are cross-country in nature, and do not involve a time series.  As 
such, the data should not be used to infer that an exchange can directly increase its trading 
activity  by  increasing  the  scope  of  cross-market  surveillance.    A  change  in  the  scope  of 
surveillance without any change in the underlying factors that explain why some countries have  
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extensive cross-market surveillance and others do not may not result in any notable change in 
trading activity.  Rather, the correct interpretation of the statistical relations in Table 6 is as 
follows: the data indicate that the factors that explain the additional cross-market surveillance in 
certain  jurisdictions  also  facilitate  additional  trading  in  those  jurisdictions  by  enhancing  the 
confidence  of  market  participants.    By  contrast,  as  many  exchanges  with  and  without  high 
integrity  nevertheless  purport  to  have  extensive  single-market  surveillance,  single-market 
surveillance does not distinguish one exchange from another and is hence unrelated to trading 
activity. 
 
  Models (2) and (3a and 3b) provide analogous regressions to Model (1), albeit with a few 
main  differences  that  are  worth  highlighting  in  regards  to  the  use  of  the  number  of  listed 
companies in Model (2) and market capitalization in Model (3a and 3b) instead of the number of 
trades.  In Model (2), the scope of cross-market surveillance is associated with a greater number 
of listed companies.  An increase in cross-market surveillance is by 1 type of manipulation is 
associated with an increase in the number of companies by 196.  As this effect is unrealistically 
large, we re-ran this regression without the outlier observation (as discussed immediately above), 
and the economic significance of this effect reduced to 15 newly firms listed associated with an 
increase in the scope of surveillance by 1 extra type of manipulation.  Note as well that there is a 
negative association between the scope of single-market surveillance and the number of listed 
companies.  Referring back to Table 5, we find a positive correlation of 0.51 between cross-
market surveillance and the number of listed companies, and a negative correlation of -0.22 
between the number of listed companies and single-market surveillance.  One explanation for this 
somewhat puzzling result is that companies are more inclined to list in lower integrity markets 
whereby company insiders can trade in ways that are personally beneficial and not subject to 
detection by surveillance.  This effect may also be different for different levels of exchange 
integrity  (i.e.,  a  nonlinear  relation),  but  the  extent  of  data  do  not  enable  such  tests  of 
nonlinearities. 
 
  Model (3a) in Table 6 provides evidence of a positive relation between the scope of 
cross-market surveillance and market capitalization.  An increase in the scope of cross-market 
surveillance is associated with an increase in market capitalization by US$62.6 billion.  The 
economic significance of this effect is robust to the inclusion/exclusion of outlier observations.  
As discussed above, this does not necessarily mean that an exchange can increase its market 
capitalization  by  increasing  cross-market  surveillance;  rather,  it  means  that  in  comparing  
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exchanges  around  the  world,  the  factors  that  have  given  rise  to  additional  cross-market 
surveillance have also facilitated an increase in market capitalization. 
 
  Model  (3b)  is  presented  to  show  robustness  to  identify  the  models  with  statistically 
significant  coefficient  estimates.    In  Model  (3b)  the  variables  were  selected  to  ensure  each 
equation  was  identified  in  the  3SLS  system  with  statistically  significant  coefficients.    The 
variables are similar to those in Model (3a), but with a slightly more parsimonious specification.  
As well, in equation (2) in Model (3b), the number of surveillance departments is used instead of 
the  number  of  traded  products  as  that  coefficient  estimate  is  statistically  significant.    The 
estimated coefficient of interest is extremely similar to that in equation (3) of Model (3a): an 
increase  in  the  scope  of  cross-market  surveillance  is  associated  with  an  increase  in  market 
capitalization by US$53.1 billion, and this result continues to be significant at the 1% level, and 
the  scope  of  single-market  surveillance  continues  to  be  statistically  insignificant.    Broadly 
speaking, selecting identifying variables for their statistical significance in the set of equations 
does not impact the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients relating single- and cross-
market surveillance to market activity.  There are some differences in the economic significance, 
but not to the degree that changes our qualitative conclusions about the role of cross-market 
surveillance in exchange operation.
16 
 
  Overall,  Models  (1)  – (3) provide strong evidence that exchange quality (number of 
trades,  listed  companies  and  market  capitalization)  and  cross-market  surveillance  are  highly 
related.  Controlling for simultaneous causality to the fullest extent possible given the limitations 
with the sample size, the data are consistent with the view that exchanges can enhance their 
market integrity by increasing the scope of their cross-market surveillance.  The regressions were 
quite robust (except where otherwise noted), and have fairly high adjusted R
2 values explaining 
up to 60% of the variation in the dependent variables. 
 
Section 5 below qualitatively discusses limitations and extensions associated with the 
regression evidence on the scope of surveillance and related issues not addressed by the data.  But 
                                                 
     
16  Also, we considered mining equations (1) and (2) for more parsimonious specifications that enabled more 
statistically  significant  coefficient  estimates  for  the  identifying  variables.    None  of  the  specifications  considered 
warranted a change in the inferences drawn from the data as discussed above.  Alternative specifications are available 
upon request.  
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before proceeding to that discussion, we first address the empirical issue of factors related to 
international differences in the effectiveness of surveillance in subsection 4.2. 
 
4.2. The Effectiveness of Market Surveillance 
 
  In this subsection we provide OLS and ordered logit estimates of the effectiveness of 
market surveillance.  The dependent variables in this section are the qualitative rankings on the 1 
(low effectiveness) – 5 (high effectiveness) scale.
17  These data to some degree are of course 
subject to a self-reporting bias, but nevertheless provide guidance as to the factors that affect the 
self-satisfaction  of  surveillance  authorities  with  the  quality  of  the  work  they carry out.  We 
present 7 models (labeled Models 4 – 10 in Table 7) with different specifications of the dependent 
and explanatory variables. 
 
[Table 7 About Here] 
 
  Models  (4)  –  (6)  use  the  average  ranking  variable  for  all  elements  of  effectiveness 
defined in Table 3, In Models (7) – (10) the dependent variable is defined differently.  Model (7) 
uses the ranking for real time surveillance, while Models (8), (9) and (10) use the rankings for 
cross-product, cross-market and cross-border surveillance, respectively.  Models (7) – (10) use 
ordered logit models, not OLS, as the dependent variable is an ordinal ranking variable that takes 
on a finite number of discrete variables.  Models (4) – (6) use an average ranking and hence can 
assume a continuous range of values such that OLS was used.  Tobit regressions were also 
estimated for Models (4) – (6) (since the dependent variable is bounded), but since the regression 
results were not materially different we only present the OLS estimates (Tobit estimates are 
available upon request). 
 
Table 7 Models (4) – (6) indicate jurisdictions are much more inclined to provide a 
higher effectiveness rating where the exchange is more directly involved in surveillance.  While 
La Porta et al. (2006) do not examine market surveillance, the finding herein that exchanges are 
more effective at market surveillance than securities commissions is nevertheless consistent with 
evidence on provided in La Porta et al. (2006) in regards to enforcement of securities laws.  The 
                                                 
     
17   Figure 4 provided companion evidence on effectiveness of surveillance; however, as discussed supra note 15 
and accompanying text, that data was limited in that only 13 jurisdictions provided data used in Figure 4 and therefore 
those data are not used in the regression analyses in this subsection.  
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data  generally  indicate  a  1-point  increase  (out  of  5)  in  the  role  of  the  exchange  versus  the 
securities commission is associated with a 0.7 increase in the effectiveness rating. 
 
Model (6) also indicates a positive association between information sharing arrangements 
and effectiveness; however, that effect is not robust to the specifications in Models (4) and (5).  
Model (3) further indicates a positive association between effectiveness and the average value of 
trades and the number of products traded on the exchange.  One possible explanation for these 
latter results is that those exchanges have greater operating budgets for surveillance technology 
and staff. 
 
Consistent with Models (4) – (6), Model (7) indicates a positive association between the 
role  of  the  exchange  versus  the  securities  commission  and  the  effectiveness  of  real  time 
surveillance.  However, note that the role of the exchange is not associated with effectiveness for 
cross-product,  cross-market  or  cross-border  surveillance.    Effectiveness  of  cross-market  and 
cross-border  surveillance  is  positively  associated  with  the  scope  of  information  sharing 
arrangements, and that effect is significant at the 10% level in Model (9) for cross-market and at 
the 1% level for cross-border in Model (10).  Recall as well from Table 4 Panel B and Figure 5 
that securities commissions are more likely than exchanges to engage in information sharing 
arrangements and share a greater scope of information pertaining to surveillance. 
 
  In sum, the data introduced in this paper present a picture whereby jurisdictions are more 
satisfied with domestic single-market surveillance where the exchange plays a primary role in the 
surveillance.  Exchanges, however, are less adept than securities commissions at establishing 
information sharing arrangements.  Likewise, jurisdictions with exchanges playing a primary role 
in surveillance over securities commissions are likewise less satisfied with the effectiveness of 
their cross-market surveillance than their single-market surveillance.  Therefore, there appears to 
be ample scope for exchanges to expand their information sharing arrangements; this in turn 
would thereby facilitate trading volume. 
 
5. Limitations and Extensions 
 
  This  paper  presented  a  first-ever  direct  comparison  of  market  surveillance  across 
financial markets around the world.  The data are nevertheless limited in scope.  In this study we 
were able to obtain confidential private data from 25 jurisdictions from North, Central and South  
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America, Western and Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia.  Our empirical analyses presented a 
variety of robustness checks and controls for potential endogeneity and collinearity, among other 
things.    Additional  robustness  checks  were  discussed  and  are  available  upon  request.    For 
instance, we considered dropping certain exchanges from the data as potential outliers.  Any 
single exchange in the data did not materially influence the statistical significance of the results, 
although we did discuss cases in which economic significance was affected by the exclusion of 
the largest exchange in the data.  As well, excluding groups of exchanges at the same time was 
not possible with the limited degrees of freedom. 
 
In subsection 4b we considered the possibility of self reporting biases in regards to the 
respondent’s  perceptions  of  their  own  surveillance  effectiveness.    That  type  of  self-reported 
information is nevertheless informative as it enables a qualitative assessment of where exchanges 
are  at  in  terms  of  their  own  self  satisfaction,  and  what  drives  differences  in  the  level  of 
satisfaction across exchanges.  All of the exchanges were informed about, and assured of the 
confidentiality of their data, which we believe minimizes self-reporting biases.  We also noted 
that the perceptions were very consistent with other hard data provided by the exchanges and 
commissions.  For example, Figure 4 and Table 4 Panel B provided very robust findings about 
surveillance  effectiveness  in  terms  of  self-assessment  and  the  proportion  of  manipulations 
detected relative to trading activity. 
 
Ideally, one would like to expand the number of jurisdictions, but at this stage our data 
comprise all exchanges and securities commissions that were willing to participate given the 
extent and sensitivity of information that was sought.  Future research could also examine issues 
in surveillance in relation to changes in technology and the structure of stock exchanges around 
the world. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, we concentrated on an exchange’s or securities regulator’s 
surveillance  of  potentially  manipulative  trading  practices  on  both  a single-market and cross-
market level, which is usually carried out with the use of sophisticated computer surveillance 
systems. While we recognize that there are other factors which contribute to the effectiveness of 
surveillance  activities,  such  as  an  educated  and  diligent  surveillance  staff,  investigation  and 
enforcement powers and a management with political will and not subject to conflicts of interest 
(Pritchard, 2003), we believe that the extent to which trading is now wholly automated make 
surveillance activities very much dependent upon system capabilities.  It is therefore not within  
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the scope of this paper to analyze exchange surveillance on the more general level, but our survey 
data we nevertheless as generalizable as possible.  Further research could shed additional light on 




Market manipulation refers to a wide range of trading practices that distort prices and 
inhibit market integrity and efficiency, and the detection of such practices is carried out by market 
surveillance.  This paper presented a first-ever direct comparison of the scope of single- and 
cross-market surveillance of such manipulative practices around the world.  The data examined 
also enabled consideration of the effectiveness of single- and cross-market surveillance. 
 
The  new  data  introduced  in  this  paper  indicated  a  number  of  new  insights  about 
international differences in market surveillance in relation to market quality and integrity. On one 
hand, the data showed that jurisdictions with exchanges as SROs are more intensive in regards to 
single-market surveillance than securities commissions.  On the other hand, SRO exchanges do 
not play a greater role in cross-market surveillance.  Cross-market surveillance is more effective 
with information sharing arrangements, and securities commissions are more likely to engage in 
information sharing than exchanges.   
 
The  empirical  analyses  in  this  paper  showed  that  single-market  surveillance  is 
uncorrelated with trading activity, while cross-market surveillance is highly positively correlated 
with trading activity.  This evidence was robust in terms of simple univariate evidence as well as 
in the context of simultaneous equation analyses that control for the endogeneity of surveillance 
activities vis-à-vis trading. 
 
As at 2005, there is a dearth of cross-market surveillance in most jurisdictions around the 
world.    The  data  in  this  paper  are  consistent  with  the  view  that  there  is  ample  scope  for 
jurisdictions to expand their cross-market surveillance.  Such a change would stimulate market 
integrity,  enhance  investor  confidence,  and  facilitate  trading  activity.   Future  research  could 
fruitfully  examine  issues  involving  market  integrity  alongside  the  expanding  scope  of  cross-
market surveillance, changes in the structure of exchanges, and the willingness to coordinate 
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Figure 1. Regions Represented in the Data and Exchanges versus Regulators 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the jurisdictions in the data.  In total there are 25 jurisdictions.  Securities regulators provided the data from some 
jurisdictions and exchange provided the data in others.  There is no overlap in the data from securities commissions and exchanges in 
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Figure 2. Scope of Single- and Cross-Market Surveillance Suspected or Detected
Figure 2 summarizes the scope of single- and cross-market surveillance suspected or detected for all 25 jurisdictions in the sample.  
The scope of surveillance is defined as follows: for each type of manipulation (summarized in Table 1), a dummy variable of 0 or 1 is 
assigned depending on whether or this issue is investigated by the regulator and that these variables are summed across the market.  
The  scope  of  single-market  surveillance  is  indicates  in  solid  bars  in  the  back  row  and  is  expressed  as a  percentage of the 25 
jurisdictions in the data.  The scope of cross-market surveillance is indicated in hatched bars in the front row and is expressed as a 
percentage of the 13 jurisdictions with foreign based companies listed on their exchange.  Note that cross-market also refers to cross-
product and as such the scope of cross market surveillance is if anything overstated relative to the need for cross-market surveillance 




Figure 3. Relationship between Scope of 




































Scope of Cross Market Surveillance Scope of Single Market Surveillance
Minimum Maximum
Figure  3  plots  the  scope  of  single-  and  cross-market  surveillance  (the  sum  of  dummy  variables  equal  to  1  for  each  type  of 
manipulation in Table 1 for each jurisdiction) against the annual number of trades in the jurisdiction.  The minimum and maximum 






















































Figure 4.  Median Number of Manipulations (All Types of Manipulations) / Trades Detected 
(Domestic and Cross Market)
 
Figure 4 indicates the median number of manipulations detected in each jurisdiction as a percentage of the number of trades in the 
jurisdiction for each year 2002-2005.  The data were provided by 7 exchanges (2 Americas, 2 Asia and 3 European) and 6 securities 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. Information Sharing Arrangements Across Jurisdictions
Figure 5 summarizes the types of information sharing arrangements for each of the 25 jurisdictions in the data.  The data are expressed 




Table 1. Indicators of Market Manipulation 
This table summarizes primary different types of market manipulation that is considered by market surveillance authorities (stock exchanges in the case of 
SROs or securities commissions / regulatory authorities for other exchanges) for both single-and cross-market surveillance. 
Advancing the bid   Increasing the bid for a security or derivative to increase its price  
Capping [Pegging]  
Effecting  transactions  of  instrument  underlying  an  option  shortly  before  the  options  expiration  date  to  prevent  a 
rise/decline in price of the instrument so previously written call/ put options will expire worthless, protecting premiums 
previously received. 
Churning   Frequent and excessive trading of a clients account 
Commodity flows to delivery 
points (1) 
Large  shipments  of  the  commodity  flow  to  the  delivery  point  immediately  prior  to  and  during  the  delivery  period. 
Moreover, shipments from the delivery point are abnormally small during the delivery period as traders amass stocks to 
make delivery. 
Commodity flows to delivery 
points (2) 
Delivery  point  receipts  are  abnormally  small  after  the  delivery  period  because  of  the  glut  of  the  commodity  at  the 
delivery point that results from the artificially large receipts during the delivery period. Shipments from the delivery point 
increase after the end of a corner as some of the excess shipments are returned to their original sources and delayed 
shipments are released. 
Contract Prices at Different 
Expirations 
The price of the manipulated contract is abnormally high relative to the price of the contracts expiring later (that is, the 
price of the “front month” contract is artificially high relative to the deferred or “back month” contracts). 
Corner   Securing  control  of  the  bid/demand-side  of  both  the  derivative  and  the  underlying  asset.  Dominant  position  can  be 
exploited to manipulate the price of the derivative and/or the asset. 
Dissemination  Dissemination of false or misleading market information  
Front running  A transaction to the detriment of the order giver on the basis of and ahead of an order which he is to carry out for another 
Insider trading   When a trade has been influenced by the privileged possession of corporate information or price sensitive market order 
that has not yet been made public 
Marking the close   Buying or selling securities or derivatives contracts at the close of the market in an effort to alter the closing price of the 
security or derivatives contract 
Marking the open   The placing of purchase orders at slightly higher prices/sale orders at lower prices to drive up/suppress the price of the 
securities when the market opens 
Matched orders   Transactions where both buy and sell orders are entered at the same time with the same price and quantity by different but 
colluding parties. 
Mini Manipulation   Trading in the underlying security of an option in order to manipulate its price so that the options will become in-the-
money 
Money laundering   Creating  the appearance  that  money value  obtained  from  serious  crimes,  such  as drug  trafficking  or terrorist  activity, 
originated from a illegitimate source 
Option Expiration Date  Stock Price or Volume Changes at Option Expiration Date: unusual changes in the stock price and/or trading volume 
around the date of expiration of the option  
Option Introduction Date  Stock Price or Volume Changes at Option Introduction Date: unusual changes in the stock price and/or trading volume 
around the date of introduction of the option  
Parking or warehousing   Hiding the true ownership of securities / underlying by creating a set of fictitious transactions and trades. 
Pre-arranged trade   Transactions in which the price, terms or contra-side have been pre-arranged. 
Prices of Related Products at 
Delivery Locations 
The expiring futures price and the spot price at the delivery market are abnormally high relative to prices at other, non-
deliverable locations; the prices of related products; and prices of non-deliverable grades of the same commodity. 
Pump & dump/Ramping   Buying at increasingly higher prices. Securities are sold in the market (often to retail customers) at the higher prices 
Short Sales 
A market transaction in which an investor sells stock he does not have or he has borrowed in anticipation of a price 
decline.  This is not per se manipulative but is considered manipulative in some jurisdictions in conjunction with other 
types of actions; for example, in Canada, under UMIR Rule 6.2(viii)(ix), a short sale cannot be at a price that is less than 
the last sale price. 
Spoofing/Painting the tape  
Engaging  in  a  series  of  transactions  reported  on  a  public  display  facility  to give  the impression  of  activity or price 
movement in a security (e.g. misleading trading, switches, giving up priority, layering bid/asks, fictitious orders for the 
case of spoofing, etc.) 
Spot and Futures Prices at 
Different Delivery Points 
The spot price in the delivery market declines both absolutely and relative to deferred month futures prices and spot 
prices at other locations around the end of futures trading or the delivery period. 
Squeeze   Taking advantage of a shortage in an asset by controlling the demand-side and exploiting market congestion during such 
shortages in a way as to create artificial prices. 
Strike Price and Stock Price at 
Expiration  Option Strike Price equals (or is close to) Underlying Stock Price at Option Expiration 
Trade through 
The  completion  of  a  client' s  order  at  a  price  inferior  to  the  best  posted  bid  or  ask.    This  is  not  per se considered 
manipulative, but many commentators (and the surveillance authorities themselves) did consider it manipulative because 
the market maker who received the order is unable or unwilling to fill it at the best posted bid or ask price, and hence the 
trade is instead executed at the market maker' s price. 
Wash sale   Improper transaction in which there is no genuine change in actual ownership of the security or derivative contract 






Table 2. Comparison Tests for Market Capitalization of Jurisdictions Included versus Excluded from Data 
This table presents the means and medians of the equity market capitalization of the exchanges included versus excluded from 
the  sample.    Values  expressed  in  millions  of  2005  US  dollars.    Means  and  median  tests  are  based  on  procedures  at 
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/Service/Statistics.html   Market capitalization data are from the World Federation of Exchanges 
http://www.world-exchanges.org/   There are 5 exchanges in the data from the Americas, 8 exchanges from Asia, and 12 
Exchanges from Europe/Africa. The difference tests are provided for each category, but statistical significance is difficult to 
interpret given the small number of observations in each category.  Median values and other more precise details or categories 
are not provided in order to maintain the confidentiality on the exchanges that provided the surveillance data used in the 
subsequent tables. 
 
   
(1) Included in 
Data 
(2) Excluded from 
Data 
Ratio Values  
(1) / (2) 
P-Value for 
Difference Tests 
for Means and 
Medians 
Mean  449,992.06  1,726,331.01  0.26  p <= 0.52 
Americas 
Median  ---  ---  4.98  p <= 0.36 
Mean  419,236.59  505,181.51  0.83  p <= 0.85 
Asia 
Median  ---  ---  4.06  p <= 0.30 
Mean  253,935.18  145,153.08  1.75  p <= 0.25 
Europe/Africa  
Median  ---  ---  0.56  p <= 1.00 
Mean  339,430.95  477,033.61  0.71  p <= 0.88 
Total Sample 




Table 3. Definitions of Variables 
This table defines the variables used in the empirical analyses.  Data were provided by 16 stock exchanges and 9 securities commissions from North, Central 
and South America, Western and Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia (see Figure 1). 
Surveillance Variables 
Scope of Single-market 
Surveillance 
The sum of dummy variables equal to 1 where surveillance is carried out over each of the market manipulative practices 
identified (e.g., spoofing, painting the tape, wash sales, etc.) on a single-market basis.  The manipulative practices are as 
defined in Table 1. 
Scope of Cross-market 
Surveillance 
The sum of dummy variables equal to 1 where surveillance is carried out over each of the market manipulative practices 
identified in the jurisdiction (e.g., spoofing, painting the tape, wash sales, etc.) on a cross-market basis (including cross-
product, cross-exchange and international).  The manipulative practices are as defined in Table 1.  Any type of single-
market manipulation can also be a cross market manipulation (e.g., for a security that is listed on more than 1 exchange.) 
Exchange vs Commission 
Surveillance -- Establish Rules 
The  average  ranking  (5=exchange,  1=securities  commission)  for  establishing  listing  standards,  establishing  market 
trading  rules,  establishing  rules  on cross-product trading, establishing rules  on  cross-market trading, and  establishing 
rules on cross-border trading.  Where appropriate, the subcomponent of the ranking is used. 
Exchange vs Commission 
Surveillance -- Monitoring 
The average ranking (5=exchange, 1=securities commission) for monitoring listing standards, real time surveillance, post 
trade  surveillance,  monitoring  of  rules  on  cross-product  trading,  monitoring  of  rules  on  cross-market  trading,  and 
monitoring of rules on cross-border trading.  Where appropriate, the subcomponent of the ranking is used. 
Exchange vs Commission 
Surveillance -- Enforcement 
The average ranking (5=exchange, 1=securities commission) for enforcing listing standards, enforcement market trading 
rules, enforcement of rules on cross-product trading, enforcement of rules on cross-market trading, and enforcement of 
rules on cross-border trading.  Where appropriate, the subcomponent of the ranking is used. 
Exchange vs Commission  
Real Time Surveillance  Ranking of exchange’s role (5=exchange 1=securities commission) in carrying out real time surveillance  
Exchange vs Commission 
Post Trade Surveillance  Ranking of exchange’s role (5=exchange 1=securities commission) in carrying out post trade surveillance 
Exchange  A dummy variable equal to 1 where the exchange was responsible for primary market surveillance in the jurisdiction as 
an SRO. 
Number of Surveillance 
Departments  The number of departments deemed to have at least some responsibility for carrying out market surveillance. 
Effectiveness of Surveillance 
Ranking  of  ability  (1=unable  5=excellent)  to  carry  out  surveillance  on  the  following  matters:  real  time  surveillance, 
cross-product  trading  surveillance,  cross-market  trading  surveillance,  cross-border  trading  surveillance,  OTC  trading 
surveillance, ability to replay the market, ability to track changes in price or volume of a particular security or derivatives 
and underlying, ability to track changes in price or volume of a related scurrility or derivatives and underlying, identify 
concentration  of  ownership,  provide  alerts  and  information  concerning  suspicious  transactions,  provide  alerts  and 
information  concerning  suspicious  cross-market  transactions,  provide  alerts  and  information  concerning  cross-border 
transactions, identify potentially large market losses / gains incurred by members or large market participants, ability to 
share data with  other markets, ability to share system with other markets, identify parties to the transaction, provide 




Sum of dummy variables equal to 1 for types of information contained in information sharing arrangements: (1) identity 
of the member/intermediary, (2) identity of the dealer, (3) identities of the member/intermediary, (4) trading activity, (5) 
positions  held  by  the  member/intermediary,  (6)  details  of  investigation  of  the  member/intermediary,  (7)  details  of 
investigation  of  dealers  or  clients  of  the  member/intermediary,  (8)  details  of  disciplinary  action  against  the 
member/intermediary, (9) details of disciplinary action against the dealers or clients of the member/intermediary. 
Specifics in Information Sharing 
Arrangements 
Dummy variables equal to one where the jurisdiction has information sharing arrangements on each of the following 
categories: real time trading information provided electronically, end of day trading information provided electronically, 
delayed  trading  information  provided  electronically,  daily  market  surveillance  reports  (electronic),  daily  market 
surveillance  reports  (hard  copy),  regular  market  surveillance  reports  (electronic),  regular  market  surveillance  reports 
(hard copy), market surveillance reports (electronic) upon request, market surveillance reports (hard copy) upon request, 
obtaining information / documents relating to a product traded through the other organization, obtaining information / 
documents  on  current  and  former  intermediaries,  obtaining  information  /  documents  on  current  members,  obtaining 
information / documents on former members, obtaining other general information / documents, onsite inspection of books 
/ records, ability to carry out separate yet coordinated investigation, participate in joint investigations, share investigatory 
information upon request, ability and assistance to proceed with civil enforcement, ability and assistance to proceed with 
criminal enforcement, assistance in freezing / sequestration of assets, and other. 





Table 3 (Continued) 
Market Variables 
Number of Trades  The number of equity trades in 2005. 
Number of Shares Traded  The number of shares traded in 2005. 
Average Turnover  The average daily turnover in 2005. 
Average Value of Trades  The average value of trades in 2005, expressed in US dollars. 
Total Value of Trades  The total value of trades in 2005, expressed in US dollars. 
Number of Companies  The number of companies listed on the stock exchange as at December 2005. 
Market Capitalization  The market capitalization of the stock exchange as at December 2005, expressed in US dollars. 
Proportion of Foreign Companies  The proportion of foreign companies listed on the domestic stock exchange as at December 2005. 
Proportion of Foreign Trades  The proportion of trades of foreign listed firms on the domestic stock exchange in 2005. 
Proportion of US Cross Listings  Proportion of companies cross-listed in the US. 
Number of Products  The number of products offered by the exchange (including derivatives, bonds, etc.). 
Country Variables 
Civil Law  A dummy variable equal to 1 for civil law jurisdictions and 0 for common law jurisdictions. 





Table 4.  Panel A.  Summary Statistics for Full Sample 
This table presents the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value for variables as defined in Table 3.  Data were provided on a 
confidential basis from 25 jurisdictions around the world.  To maintain this confidentiality, medians, minimums and maximums are not indicated for 
selected variables.    For certain variables data are only available for 24 of the 25 jurisdictions.  Variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 3. 
Variable  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  Number of 
Jurisdictions 
Surveillance Characteristics             
Scope of Single-market Surveillance  14.48  15  5.39  4  22  25 
Scope of Cross-market Surveillance  2.60  0  4.11  0  15  25 
Exchange vs Commission Surveillance -- 
Establish Rules  2.59  2.67  0.87  1.17  4.17  25 
Exchange vs Commission Surveillance – 
Monitoring  2.68  2.86  0.89  0.71  4.71  25 
Exchange vs Commission Surveillance – 
Enforcement  2.49  2.60  1.19  0.53  5  25 
Exchange vs Commission -- 
Real Time Surveillance  3.96  4  1.06  1  5  25 
Exchange vs Commission 
Post Trade Surveillance  3.56  4  1.23  1  5  25 
Information Sharing Arrangements  4.16  4  3.29  0  9  25 
Number of Surveillance Departments  1.60  1  1.32  1  7  25 
Average Effectiveness Ratings for Surveillance  2.15  2.38  1.25  0  3.75  24 
Market Variables             
Number of Trades (Thousands)  37367.95    80527.01      25 
Number of Shares Traded (Millions)  367558.79    1146934.03      25 
Average Daily Turnover (Millions)  2286.20    4661.17      25 
Average Value of Trades (Thousands)  32.82    84.31      25 
Total Value of Trades (Millions)  337568.13    516366.54      25 
Number of Listed Companies  565.96    773.54      25 
Market Capitalization (Millions USD)  339430.95    429486.28      25 
Proportion of Foreign Shares  0.05  0.00  0.12      25 
Proportion of Foreign Shares Traded  0.03  0.00  0.05      25 
Proportion of Companies Cross Listed in the 
US  0.02  0.02  0.03      25 
Number of Products Traded on the Exchange  7.36  8.00  2.72      25 
Country Variables             
Civil Law  0.68  1.00  0.48      25 





Table 4.  Panel B. Summary Statistics for Exchanges versus Securities Commissions 
This table presents the mean and median values for variables as defined in Table 3 for the 16 exchange based jurisdictions and 9 securities commission 
based jurisdictions. To maintain confidentiality, medians are not indicated for certain variables.  There is no overlap of exchanges and securities 
commissions in the same jurisdiction.  Variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 3. 
  Exchanges  Securities Commissions 
Variable  Mean  Median  Number of 
Jurisdictions  Mean  Median  Number of 
Jurisdictions 
Surveillance Characteristics             
Scope of Single-market Surveillance  15.00  15.00  16  13.70  12.00  9 
Scope of Cross-market Surveillance  2.80  0.00  16  2.30  0.00  9 
Exchange vs Commission Surveillance -- 
Establish Rules  2.78  3.00  16  2.32  2.42  9 
Exchange vs Commission Surveillance – 
Monitoring  2.99  2.86  16  2.21  2.50  9 
Exchange vs Commission Surveillance – 
Enforcement  2.73  2.80  16  2.12  2.10  9 
Exchange vs Commission -- Real Time 
Surveillance  4.40  4.00  16  3.30  3.00  9 
Exchange vs Commission -- Post Trade 
Surveillance  4.00  4.00  16  2.90  3.00  9 
Information Sharing Arrangements  3.80  4.00  16  4.70  4.50  9 
Number of Surveillance Departments  1.93  1.00  16  1.10  1.00  9 
Average Effectiveness Ratings for Surveillance  2.45  2.65  16  1.66  1.85  8 
Market Variables             
Number of Trades (Thousands)  51777.78    16  15753.22    9 
Number of Shares Traded (Millions)  170425.72    16  663258.40    9 
Average Daily Turnover (Millions)  3305.53    16  757.20    9 
Average Value of Trades (Thousands)  50.69    16  7.82    9 
Total Value of Trades (Millions)  446803.15    16  173715.60    9 
Number of Listed Companies  520.60    16  634.00    9 
Market Capitalization (Millions USD)  370038.70    16  293519.31    9 
Proportion of Foreign Shares  0.07  0.01  16  0.03  0.00  9 
Proportion of Foreign Shares Traded  0.04  0.00  16  0.01  0.00  9 
Proportion of Companies Cross Listed in the 
US  0.03  0.02  16  0.02  0.00  9 
Number of Products Traded on the Exchange  8.53  9.00  16  5.60  5.50  9 
Country Variables             
Civil Law  0.80  1.00  16  0.50  0.50  9 





Table 4.  Correlation Matrix 
This table presents correlation coefficients across selected variables defined in Tables 1 and 3.  Correlations statistically significant at the 5% level of significance are highlighted in underline font. 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22) 
   Surveillance Characteristics                                                                   
(1)  Scope of Single-market 
Surveillance 
1.00                                                                
(2)  Scope of Cross-market 
Surveillance  0.22  1.00                                                             
(3)  Average Effectiveness 
Ratings for Surveillance  0.02  -0.03  1.00                                                          
(4) 
Exchange vs Commission 
Surveillance -- Establish 
Rules 
-0.07  0.02  0.48  1.00                                                       
(5)  Exchange vs Commission 
Surveillance -- Monitoring  0.20  0.10  0.55  0.80  1.00                                                    
(6)  Exchange vs Commission 
Surveillance -- Enforcement  0.09  0.03  0.54  0.80  0.91  1.00                                                 
(7)  Exchange vs Commission 
Real Time Surveillance 
0.25  -0.01  0.23  0.54  0.74  0.60  1.00                                              
(8)  Exchange vs Commission 
Post Trade Surveillance  0.46  0.11  0.23  0.36  0.63  0.44  0.82  1.00                                           
(9)  Information Sharing  -.022  -0.15  0.09  -0.18  0.12  0.10  0.02  0.02  1.00                                        
(10)  Number of Surveillance 
Departments  0.23  0.47  0.16  0.12  0.07  0.06  0.12  0.18  -0.24  1.00                                     
  Market Characteristics                                                                  
(11)  Civil Law  0.11  -0.01  0.26  0.21  0.45  0.31  0.37  0.29  0.19  -0.08  1.00                                  
(12)  GDP / Capita  -0.29  0.27  0.28  0.52  0.42  0.27  0.09  0.11  0.13  -0.05  0.31  1.00                               
(13)  Number of Trades 
(Thousands)  0.13  0.77  0.14  0.15  0.17  0.14  0.04  0.13  -0.12  0.75  0.13  0.26  1.00                            
(14)  Number of Shares Traded 
(Millions)  0.04  0.30  -0.02  0.04  0.08  0.04  0.34  0.37  0.01  0.18  -0.31  -0.02  0.19  1.00                         
(15)  Average Daily Turnover 
(Millions)  0.24  0.14  -0.20  -0.04  0.09  -0.05  0.07  0.14  -0.25  -0.02  0.20  0.37  0.15  -0.10  1.00                      
(16)  Average Value of Trades 
(Thousands)  0.20  -0.10  0.23  -0.02  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.09  -0.24  0.02  0.20  -0.02  -0.10  -0.11  0.11  1.00                   
(17)  Total Value of Trades 
(Millions)  -0.13  0.62  0.36  0.39  0.49  0.42  0.16  0.19  0.00  0.18  0.17  0.65  0.58  0.06  0.29  -0.04  1.00                
(18)  Number of Listed Companies  -0.22  0.51  -0.24  -0.04  -0.25  -0.24  -0.48  -0.35  -0.19  0.22  -0.38  0.39  0.43  0.07  0.09  -0.06  0.46  1.00             
(19)  Market Capitalization 
(Millions USD) 
-0.21  0.58  0.18  0.25  0.23  0.19  -0.11  -0.04  -0.07  0.09  -0.01  0.66  0.44  0.05  0.22  0.11  0.88  0.76  1.00          
(20)  Proportion of Foreign Shares  0.16  0.25  0.13  0.06  0.14  -0.01  0.03  -0.09  0.02  -0.03  0.24  0.11  -0.12  -0.19  -0.07  -0.01  0.02  -0.10  0.05  1.00       
(21)  Proportion of Foreign Shares 
Traded 
-0.01  0.03  0.48  0.60  0.58  0.38  0.32  0.30  0.17  -0.09  0.29  0.64  -0.09  -0.19  0.03  -0.02  0.34  -0.12  0.23  0.47  1.00    
(22)  Proportion of Companies 
Cross Listed in the US 
0.04  0.42  0.15  0.12  0.11  -0.06  0.01  0.00  -0.05  0.04  0.13  0.32  0.09  0.13  -0.05  0.16  0.26  0.23  0.39  0.79  0.38  1.00 
(23)  Number of Products Traded 







Table 5.  3SLS Regression Evidence of Market Surveillance, Trading Volume, Listings and Market Capitalization 
This table presents 3SLS regression analyses of the determinants of the scope of single- and cross-market surveillance activities, in conjunction with trading volume (Model 1), number of listed companies (Model 2) and market 
capitalization (Models 3a and 3b).  Variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 3.  t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  White' s (1980) heterockedasticity consistent 
covariance matrix estimator is used in all regressions. 


































































Surveillance Characteristics                                  
Exchange vs Commission -- 




(1.005)     2.560 
(2.188)** 
0.995 
(1.368)     2.395 
(2.136)** 
0.476 
(0.604)     2.214 
(1.993)**     
Information Sharing     -0.026 
(-0.219)        -0.065 
(-0.297)        -0.200 
(-0.636)          
Scope of Single-market 
Surveillance        -3802.281 
(-0.970)        -86.802 
(-1.975)**        -27960.839 
(-1.324)      -20636.407 
(-1.031) 
Scope of Cross-market 
Surveillance        25130.403 
(7.376)***        196.179 
(5.338)***        62603.243 
(3.003)***      53155.849 
(2.645)*** 
Market Characteristics                                  
Number of Trades  0.111E-04 
(0.684) 
0.414E-04 
(7.874)***                            
Number of Companies           -0.739E-03 
(-0.390) 
0.004 
(2.567)***                   









(2.248)**   
Civil Law        4908.685 
(0.402)        -187.002 
(-0.951)        -67439.870 
(0.617)      -76513.763 
(-0.718) 
GDP per Capita        -0.140 
(-0.216)        0.008 
(0.804)        14.847 
(2.354)**      17.267 
(2.890)*** 
Number of Products     -0.115 
(-0.443) 
1936.579 
(0.364)     -0.003 
(0.008)        -0.104 
(-0.186)          
Number of Surveillance 
Departments                        1.052 
(2.642)***   
Proportion of US Cross-
Listings     56.207 
(3.383)*** 
-1347926.10 
(-3.363)***     28.882 
(1.163) 
-4940.392 
(-1.158)     21.794 
(0.800) 
253023.033 
(0.122)    24.587 
(1.195)   
Diagnostics                                  
Number of Observations  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25 
Adjusted R
2  0.039  0.634  0.428  0.082  0.270  0.059  0.102  0.243  0.483  0.105  0.479  0.548 
F Statistic  1.49  9.33***  3.99***  2.07  2.78**  1.30  2.36  2.54*  5.48***  2.41**  8.38***  8.29*** 
Loglikelihood  -73.871  -51.386  -302.692  -73.309  -60.030  -194.126  -73.028  -60.488  -344.637  -72.983  -58.298  -344.210 





Table 6.  OLS and Ordered Logit Regression Analyses of Effectiveness of Market Surveillance 
This table presents OLS and ordered logit regression analyses of the determinants of the scope of the effectiveness of single- and cross-market surveillance activities.  
Variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 3.  *, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  White' s (1980) heterockedasticity consistent 















































Surveillance Characteristics                      
Exchange vs Commission -- 


























Scope of Single-market 
Surveillance 
0.015 
(0.319)        -0.063 
(-1.403)          
Scope of Cross-market 
Surveillance 
-0.011 














Exchange        -0.177 
(-0.332)             
Market Characteristics                      
Number of Trades 
(Thousands)     0.119E-05 
(0.928) 
-0.275 
(-0.182)             
Average Value of Trades 
(Thousands)        0.004 
(4.059)***             
Proportion of US Cross 
Listings                    -8.008 
(-0.771) 
Number of Products Traded 
on the Exchange        0.211 






Ordered Logit Parameters                      
























Diagnostics                      




Ordered Logits)  0.117  0.163  0.235  0.136  0.340  0.115  0.186 
F Statistic (Chi-Square for 
Ordered Logits)  1.76  2.49*  2.12*  10.127**  23.203***  8.293  11.638*** 
Loglikelihood  -35.057  -35.030  -30.859  -32.141  -22.509  -31.828  -25.497 
Akaike Information Statistic  3.338  3.253  3.292             
 
 